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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TEMPLE 
OFDOOM: ASHORTSTORY 
Rodney A. Smol/a* 
"I am not the first man in this office who has found it neces-
sary to construe liberally his inherent power as Commander-in-
Chief." 
The Secretary of State always felt least comfortable when the 
President waxed historical; the President was a fierce revisionist, 
and always to his own ends. He did not appreciate the Secretary's 
own, more subtle sense of precedent in international affairs. "Yet, 
Mr. President," the Secretary responded diffidently, "the exercise 
of your inherent powers, whatever they may be legally, will still 
involve substantial political risk. The decision you are contem-
plating will not play well in Congress or in the media." 
From the President's expression the Secretary knew instantly 
that he had blundered in shifting to the political plane. "Mr. Sec-
retary," said the President, "I'll handle the politics, and I'll handle 
the goddamn Congress, and I'll handle the media, and I'll even 
handle the God-blessed Constitution. You handle our allies and 
the U.N. And if they can't be handled, screw 'em. No President 
with guts has ever gotten a bad shake from the American people. 
Americans don't give a damn if a President is wrong once in a 
while-hell, they know politicians-but they absolutely will never 
forgive a President who can't make up his damn mind. Harry 
Truman always looked like he knew what he was doing, and 
Jimmy Carter always looked like he didn't. Carter probably had 
twice Truman's brainpower, but the people thought he was a 
pussyfooter. Now I am not a pussyfooter, you understand? Mos-
cow has sent out the signal for the final push in El Salvador. This 
is the Cuban missile crisis all over, this is the Monroe Doctrine all 
over, and I am not going to sit by and concede this hemisphere to 
the reds one tin-horse banana republic at a time." 
No reply was called for. 
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The rest of the cabinet was silent-not out of embarrassment 
for the Secretary, for there was a certain relish in his humilia-
tion-but in the quiet tension that precedes a momentous deci-
sion. The President turned to the other side of the cabinet table 
and addressed the Secretary of Defense. "Would you go over, one 
final time, the exact placement ot our forces, the initial deploy-
ment plan of the Joint Chiefs, and the various invasion sched-
ules?" The phrasing was a question, but the tone a command; the 
President was placing his personality on a wartime footing, and he 
obviously enjoyed it. 
As the Secretary of Defense impressed the President and the 
rest of the Cabinet with a masterfully precise, orderly, and self-
confident presentation, the Secretary of State's mind wandered. 
He wished he'd had the courage to challenge the President's as-
sumptions. But a challenge would have been ineffective even if 
the logic and moral force of the arguments were compelling. With 
this President an argument needed the extra leverage of a 
threatened resignation. Henry Kissinger had prevailed many 
times with the resignation threat. But the current Secretary of 
State was no Kissinger to this President: this President was his 
own Kissinger. If he tendered his resignation, it would simply be 
accepted. Like Cyrus Vance and Alexander Haig, the most recent 
to resign as Secretaries of State over matters of "principle," the 
principle would be less remembered than the failure to survive a 
four-year term. And if his personal esteem was not enough to 
sway any votes in the room, least of all the President's, surely any 
inherent logic of his arguments would pale next to the seductive 
excitement surrounding the Commander-in-Chief's exercise of 
the war power. While talk of troop placements and timetables fil-
led the room, the Secretary of State mused over arguments that 
might have been .... Our allies cannot be "handled," Mr. Presi-
dent. If they were not with us in invading Grenada or mining 
Nicaragua they will not be with us in igniting all of Central 
America. . . . The American people have given presidents a bad 
shake for being decisive. . . . "Give 'em hell, Harry" sounds bet-
ter every year, but people forget that in Truman's second term his 
popularity was the lowest of any American president since records 
were kept-not even Richard Nixon in the heart of Watergate 
ever sunk so low .... Carter's public image may have exuded 
malaise, and maybe the public will never forgive him for Iran, but 
he also avoided a middle-eastern war-for him Camp David was 
more useful than Camp Lejeune. . . . Mr. President, this is not 
the Cuban missile crisis, you are not John Kennedy, and Ameri-
cans have changed since 1962. . . . I believe, Mr. President, that 
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your invocation of the Monroe Doctrine, although consistent with 
popular mythology, is inconsistent with the actual historical rec-
ord. . . . What you are actually invoking, sir, is not the Monroe 
Doctrine itself, but the big stick Teddy Roosevelt corollary to the 
Monroe Doctrine .... As I have written in scholarly journals, 
sir, Roosevelt perverted the Monroe Doctrine by invading Pan-
ama in 1903 and helped create a mentality that has indelibly 
alienated us from Latin America. . . . Teddy Roosevelt stated-1 
remember his exact words-that "adherence to the Monroe Doc-
trine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant 
cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an inter-
national police power." 
The Secretary of State wished he had the courage to press 
these arguments, to say that the President thought he was a cow-
boy just like Teddy Roosevelt had, but that these days cowboy 
Presidents were capable of a lot more harm. But he did not have 
the courage, and it wouldn't have made any difference anyway. 
The matter was already decided. Perhaps it had been decided as 
the landslide returns came in at the last election. The counsels of 
war were in place. 
******************** 
"The Speaker is furious," Marsha Lepcott said, in a voice 
that did not quite manage to conceal her own furor. "When he 
spoke to the President last night the President all but promised 
that no troops would move without consulting the congressional 
leadership--and now this." As the Speaker's chief aide, she had 
just returned from a hastily convened five a.m. meeting at the 
Speaker's home. The rest of his legislative staff had been rousted 
from bed and ordered to report to work immediately; they were 
now assembled in his spacious office suite. Among them were 
George Newton, a graduate of the law school and street life of 
Berkeley, a sixties casualty turned lawyer, kept on by the Speaker 
(whom Newton called "The Ayatollah," except to his face) as his 
resident parlimentarian and one-man think tank. 
"We've just gotten more from the AP wire, Marsha, and this 
thing is a helluva lot bigger than we thought an hour ago," said 
Newton. "We'd better get the Ayotollah here right away." 
Lepcott took the Associated Press dispatch from Newton and 
began to read the news for herself: 
SPECIAL BULLETIN 
. ft!anagua, Nicaragua (AP)--The United States launched a massive surprise 
mvas10n mto four Central American nations early Tuesday morning, landing by 
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sea and air on the soil of El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala. 
The sudden attacks appear to be the beginning of large-scale coordinated military 
intervention into the Central American region, and come against the backdrop of 
the past four weeks of increasing violence, tension and chaos in El Salvador. 
American troops have landed in substantial force-the number of troops ap-
pears to be between twenty and twenty-five thousand---{)n Pacific Ocean beaches 
southwest of Managua, the capital city of Nicaragua. They are advancing rapidly 
toward the capital. Heavy bombardment of the main Nicaraguan airbase near 
Managua preceded the amphibious assault. 
American helicopter and paratrooper units had landed at 2:15a.m. EST in a 
daring nighttime raid on the airport in San Salvador. A massive invasion of 
troops was taking place simultaneously near the small Salvadoran port town of 
La Liberted, which is connected by a paved highway to the capital city. Commu-
nications in and out of El Salvador are now apparently severed and no further 
details are available. 
By 2:30 a.m. Guatemalan officials had confirmed that U.S. forces were con-
ducting a "search and destroy" mission against an alleged stronghold of leftist 
guerilla forces from El Salvador and Cuban support troops near Chiquimulilla, 
Guatemala, located about fifty miles northwest of the Salvadoran border. A sur-
prise United States search and destroy attack was also conducted during the night 
on a Cuban controlled guerilla sanctuary in the mountainous Ocotepegue region 
of Honduras, about ten miles north of the border between El Salvador and 
Honduras. 
Lepcott looked up from the news dispatch and, with an audi-
ble edge of anger told Newton, "The Speaker will be here in an 
hour. He wants a briefing on his options; he's planning to meet 
with the party caucus later this morning. There are rumors that 
the President will go on national television sometime around noon 
to announce and justify the invasion. The Speaker wants to have 
his reaction to the speech set before it starts. So what are our 
options?" 
Newton did not pause before responding in his usual quiet, 
slightly pedantic voice. "From a legal perspective, our first line of 
attack is the War Powers Resolution. Under the resolution the 
President can introduce troops into hostilities in only three situa-
tions: after a congressional declaration of war, by specific statu-
tory authorization, or in a national emergency created by an 
attack on United States territory or its armed forces. The resolu-
tion requires consultation with Congress in every possible instance 
in which American forces are introduced into hostilities or situa-
tions in which hostilities are imminent. The President must report 
to the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tern of the Senate 
within forty-eight hours after American forces are utilized with a 
detailed explanation. So in this case the President has violated the 
resolution from top to bottom. There was no consultation; in fact, 
there was misconsultation, since the President deliberately misled 
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the Speaker. And more fundamentally, there was no constitu-
tional authority to launch the attack." 
"What about his inherent authority as Commander-in-
Chief?" Lepcott asked. 
"Inherent authority is simply something presidents have con-
cocted over the years to justify their own usurpations of Con-
gress's power over war," Newton said sarcastically, "The War 
Powers Resolution does not recognize any such inherent 
authority." 
"Well that's all fine and good, but it's not exactly as if the 
President is acting on blank historical slate, is it? I mean hasn't 
every president from Abraham Lincoln to Ronald Reagan 
launched troops into combat under the inherent power? You 
know how much the Speaker loves to quote Abraham Lincoln." 
"I didn't say," said Newton, "that this invasion is unusual-
just that it's unconstitutional and in violation of the War Powers 
Resolution." 
"Well, you seem awfully cocksure. I'm not even sure that 
most Americans don't prefer to leave it all to the President." 
"You said the Speaker wants to know his options, and I'm 
telling you what they are. Whether he has the political courage to 
utilize them, I have no idea-that he will have to decide for 
himself." 
******************** 
The Chief Justice of the United States was working unusually 
late, making final corrections on a draft opinion. One of his law 
clerks knocked softly on the door to his chambers and then stuck 
his head inside. "Mr. Chief Justice," said the clerk, "the President 
is coming on TV in a few seconds to discuss the invasion; I 
thought you might want to tum it on." 
The Chief Justice nodded his appreciation and turned on the 
set that he kept in his office. As the President spoke the Chief 
Justice thought of how the world had grown more bellicose in re-
cent years. He thought of body bags in Beirut lifted by stunned 
marines from the rubble; AC-130 gunships spraying the beaches 
of Grenada with cover fire as army rangers were dropped from the 
skies, their parachutes punched with bullet holes from Cuban 
machine guns: these the images of war for a nation moving slowly 
back into its early Cold War role as the anticommunist policeman 
of the world. But they were necessary images, he thought. The 
Chief Justice shared the President's two consuming preoccupa-
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tions: the first, that the source for most of the world's trouble is 
communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular; the 
second, that to counter the global Soviet threat the United States 
must be able and willing to use its military power on short notice, 
wherever necessary. 
"Now there was a time," the President was saying at that mo-
ment, "when our national security was based on a standing army 
here within our own borders and batteries of artillery along our 
coast, and of course a navy to keep the sea lanes. The world has 
changed. Today our national security can be threatened in far-
away places." The Chief Justice nodded his silent agreement. 
"Within the course of the last years," the President continued, 
"a cascade of international events has brought the evils of Soviet 
foreign policy into sharp focus. The Soviet Union in cold blood 
used a heat-seeking missile to shoot down South Korean airline 
flight 007. After the United States deployed MX missiles in West-
em Europe, a deployment essential to the security of our Euro-
pean allies, the Soviets broke off arms control negotiations. 
Terrorists bombed the U.S. Marine headquarters at the Beirut air-
port, murdering 229 marines, and American forces were forced to 
exchange fire with Syrian forces in the Bekaa Valley, forces armed 
and advised by Soviet military experts. Six thousand American 
soldiers landed in the tiny Caribbean resort island of Grenada, to 
depose a capricious communist government that was about to be-
come a Soviet-Cuban colony, a bastion to export terrorism and 
undermine democracy. Soviet efforts to prop up the Sandinista 
government in Nicaragua, an oppressive regime that Nicaraguans 
do not want, became increasingly visible. And attempts to destroy 
the anticommunist government in El Salvador grew in intensity. 
Our intelligence sources tell us that Mexico will be next." 
As he listened to the President's description of his decision to 
invade Central America, the Chief Justice thought that it was for-
tunate that most real Americans agreed with the President's fer-
vent anticommunism, his perception of the Soviet Union, and his 
willingness to employ American forces to extinguish communist 
brushfires around the globe. Isolationist and pacifistic streaks 
have always existed in the American character, and they were 
deeply enlarged by the disillusionment of Vietnam. But the in-
creasing aggressiveness of the Soviet Union, particularly its at-
tempted conquest of Afghanistan and its hard-nosed reassertion of 
power in Poland, reinvigorated the domino theory in the con-
sciousness of much of mainstream America. And the feelings of 
impotence and frustration created by the Iranian hostage crisis, 
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feelings exacerbated by the bungling ineptitude that followed, left 
many Americans both willing to endorse the future use of force 
and anxious for a military victory. The Chief Justice listened with 
a swelling sense of patriotic pride as the President turned to a map 
of Central America and explained how the massive invasion 
would root out once and for all the communist cancer that was 
spreading through Central America. 
******************** 
The senior editor of the Washington Post, Rube McClellan, 
reread the copy that his best young investigative reporter, Susan 
Marks, had handed him. 
"If this is true," McClellan said, "public support for the inva-
sion will begin to unravel. You are claiming that the President 
will blockade Cuba if the invasion bogs down in the Salvadoran 
jungles, and that the blockade plan calls for a full-scale nuclear 
alert, and issuing a Nixon-type 'madman ultimatum' to the Rus-
sians not to interfere, because the President may just be crazy 
enough to push the button if they do." 
"That is exactly my information," said Marks. 
"That may be your information, Susan, but this is incendiary 
material. We can't run it unless we're absolutely sure-and you 
won't name your source. And even if you did, your source might 
not be good enough." 
"What if I told you that my source is unimpeachable and that 
he has shown me a White House memorandum that substantiates 
his story?" 
"I'd say I still won't even consider printing the story until I 
know who the source is," said McClellan. 
Marks could see that she plainly had no chance unless she 
was frank with McClellan. "I got this information personally 
from the Secretary of State." 
McClellan leaned way back in his chair and shut his eyes. 
Marks knew not to disturb his thought. After a few moments, Mc-
Clellan stood up from behind his desk, a signal that there would 
be no argument over his decision. "For now," he said, "we do not 
run this story." 
When Marks had left the office, McClellan buzzed his admin-
istrative assistant over the intercom. "Joan, get me the Secretary 
of Defense on the phone immediately; tell him I have some urgent 
information for him." 
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The presidential press secretary read with satisfaction the 
opening story in the morning New York Times: 
A New York Times/CBS News opinion poll conducted over the last three 
days indicates that the American public on the whole supports the actions of the 
President in Central America. The questions and poll results are summarized 
below; 
l. Do you agree or disagree with the President's initial invasion in Central 
America? 
Disagree 
30% 
Don't Know 
10% 
2. Do you agree or disagree with the President's announced policy of ex-
panding the conftict throughout Central America and the Caribbean area if he 
deems it necessary? 
Agree Disagree Don't Know 
58% 32% 10% 
3. Do you agree or disagree with the President's announcement that he will 
not give in to Soviet Union threats or intimidation concerning continuation of the 
Central American war? 
Agree 
72% 
Disagree 
25% 
Don't Know 
3% 
4. Do you agree or disagree with the announced threat of the Speaker of 
the House to seek a concurrent resolution passed by the Senate and House of 
Representative ordering the President to terminate hostilities? 
Agree Disagree Don't Know 
30% 65% 5% 
The President's instincts for what would wash with the Amer-
ican public were uncanny, the Press Secretary thought. And this 
poll would make handling the assholes in the White House press 
corps a helluva lot easier at this morning's briefing . 
•••••••••••••••••••• 
The only problem with the "MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour," 
thought the Senior Associate Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court as he watched his favorite television news show, was that 
sometimes it was too much like the Socratic dialogues of his long 
by-gone law school days: to every parry a thrust, to every point a 
counterpoint, to every debate two sides. The MacNeil-Lehrer 
team could make mass murder seem like an issue on which rea-
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sonable minds could differ. The Associate Justice thought with 
some disgust of his own Chief's private views on the Central 
American war, disclosed the previous day over lunch. Television 
commentator Robin MacNeil was setting the stage for the debate 
on the war issue, a debate that the Associate Justice regarded as 
having only one intelligent side. 
"On March 5 of this year," MacNeil was saying, "United 
States military forces launched a substantial military attack on 
four central American nations: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Hondu-
ras, and Guatemala. In the six days that have passed since that 
attack, the military conflict has threatened to envelope the whole 
of Central America. As of this evening's broadcast, United States 
land, air, and naval forces are engaged in fierce combat in Nicara-
gua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama, and Hondu-
ras. Additionally, the Reuters news agency tonight reports that 
the Central American war has, in the last several hours, spread to 
the Caribbean Sea and threatens to ignite a worldwide conflict of 
potentially devastating magnitude. Naval and air forces of the 
United States have this afternoon engaged in several skirmishes, 
Reuters reports, with Cuban forces. Yesterday, the American air-
craft carrier John F. Kennedy came close to exchanging fire with a 
Soviet ship, when the Soviet destroyer refused to yield to the Ken-
nedy's command that it leave the three-mile zone surrounding the 
Kennedy. Although the destroyer retreated, the Soviet Union has 
placed its entire worldwide military apparatus on the highest level 
of alert, and has publicly warned the United States that a nuclear 
confrontation is possible if events continue to grow more bellicose. 
The conflagration in Central America and the Caribbean has cre-
ated a level of global military tension as high as any since the 
Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Jim?" 
"Thank you Robin," Jim Lehrer said, looking up from his 
notes at the camera. "During this same six-day period the level of 
internal political tension within the United States itself has esca-
lated to a degree unmatched since the height of the Watergate 
scandal. The military crisis in Central America has precipitated a 
constitutional crisis of sorts on the domestic front, as Congress in 
a rare display of independence has geared up to attempt to coun-
termand the President's decision to invade Central America. 
Against the background of this crisis, rumors have begun to circu-
late in the Capitol that the Supreme Court will be asked to render 
judgment as to the legality of the continuing prosecution of the 
Central American war. Tonight, we explore the Central Ameri-
can war, and the question of who, under the United States Consti-
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tution, has the final authority over the use of American armed 
forces. Robin?" 
"Thank you, Jim. Although the open introduction of regular 
units of the United States armed forces into the Central American 
arena began six days ago, the actual genesis of the current Ameri-
can military involvement dates back to the first term of Ronald 
Reagan, during which the United States steadily increased covert 
"paramilitary" operations in both Nicaragua and El Salvador. 
With me here in New York is Professor Linda Seith, a professor of 
Constitutional and International Law at Columbia University. 
Welcome, Professor Seith." 
"Thank you, Robin." 
"Professor Seith, the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
announced today that a majority of the members of the House 
and Senate agree that hostilities in Central America should cease 
immediately. There are now reports that tomorrow morning the 
House and Senate will vote by concurrent resolution, pursuant to 
the War Powers Resolution of 1973, that all United States forces 
in Central America be withdrawn immediately. The President's 
press secretary stated today that such a resolution would be un-
constitutional and not binding on the President. Who is correct?" 
"Well, Robin, the potential constitutional crisis posed by the 
events of the last several days is in part the result of the cloudiness 
of American constitutional law, a cloudiness caused by a contlict 
between the letter of the constitutional text and actual historical 
practice. Before the recent crisis most Americans probably as-
sumed that on an issue so fundamental as the power to wage war, 
the basic outlines of constitutional law would be reasonably clear. 
Yet in the 210th year of the Republic the critical constitutional 
questions about the war power remain unsettled. What is the 
President's inherent power to order American armed forces into 
combat? No one is really sure. What is the scope of Congress's 
power to countermand the President? The War Powers Resolu-
tion of 1973 gives Congress absolute power, but the resolution it-
self may be unconstitutional. When Congress acts to reverse a 
presidential commitment of troops, may it do so by a concurrent 
resolution device not subject to presidential veto? Again, the War 
Powers Resolution says yes, but Supreme Court decisions from 
several years ago would appear to make such a Congressional 
veto invalid. What effect does the War Powers Resolution have 
generally on the balance of constitutional power ~ha~ would o~her­
wise exist? This question has never been authontatlvely dectded. 
Finally, what role should the judiciary play in disputes over the 
1985] SHORT STORY 51 
allocation of the war power between the President and Congress? 
It is not at all clear that the Supreme Court would intervene." 
"Well, Professor Seith, if prior to the events of last week one 
were to have polled a group of reasonably well-informed Ameri-
cans and asked them if the Constitution allows the President to 
send American troops into hostilities, wouldn't the overwhelming 
number probably have said yes? Isn't the President, after all, the 
Commander-in-Chief, and hasn't every President in recent mem-
ory used troops on his own initiative?" 
"Robin, it is true that neither the Korean nor Vietnam Wars 
were fought pursuant to formal congressional declarations. The 
average American must surely assume that the invisible and om-
niscient "they" would not have let these wars slip by if they knew 
these wars were unconstitutional. The critical "theys" on this 
question, however, are the members of Congress. The fact is that 
in this century they have never made timely and forceful objec-
tions to a president's unilateral decision to send United States 
troops to war. As Justice Robert Jackson remarked in The Steel 
Seizure Case, a Supreme Court decision that declared President 
Harry Truman's seizure of the steel mills during the Korean War 
unconstitutional, the power to legislate for emergencies belongs in 
the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power 
from slipping through its fingers. In the words of Napoleon, 'the 
tools belong to the man who can use them.' " 
The Associate Justice turned the television off. His blood 
pressure couldn't take much more of the debate. He hated this 
President, who so cavalierly took the nation into war. The Consti-
tution seems so strong, he thought, but in the end it is so weak, as 
weak as the question ''whom do the generals obey?" There were 
also, after all, eloquent constitutions in Central America. His 
thoughts turned from a President he hated to a President he loved, 
perhaps too much. In their excessive admiration of John Ken-
nedy perhaps he and other Americans had given away too much 
control. Perhaps the actions of this President whom he detested 
were nothing but the logical terminus of what most presidents 
since John Kennedy had understood. Kennedy's charm, his good 
looks, and his showdown with Krushchev during the Cuban mis-
sile crisis embodied the two salient facts of the modem presidency: 
presidents can command the media and control the armed forces. 
Perhaps, thought the Associate Justice, the explanation of one of 
his favorite writers, Garry Wills, was correct. The "Appearances 
Presidency" that began with John Kennedy had an inherent ten-
dency to break down traditional restraints on authority. Ken-
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nedy's most indelible mark on the presidency was to turn 
Marshall McCluhan's remark that the "medium is the message" 
into a political formula. The image projected by Kennedy had 
become the country's self-image. And now-as witnessed by the 
morning's public opinion poll results-the image projected by this 
President, the image of the benign but forceful policeman of the 
world, had become America's new image of itself. Neither the 
Congress nor the Supreme Court has any comparable ability to 
dominate the national mood through style alone. The Associate 
Justice shuddered as he wondered what would happen if that style 
were to be translated into defiance of the Congress and the Court. 
The current President has brilliantly exploited the Kennedy 
legacy, the Justice thought, combining tough, hard-line anticom-
munist rhetoric with graceful "aw, shucks" charm. As the balance 
of power in the American press had shifted from print to televi-
sion, the balance of power in American politics had shifted to the 
President. When American troops invaded and conquered Gre-
nada, Reagan barred American journalists from the island for two 
days. He turned the entire Grenada episode into far more than a 
lopsided but trivial military victory. But Grenada was not quite 
the same as this war. For most Americans Grenada remained ob-
scure and quaint, about as much a threat to the United States as 
the Kingdom of Freedonia in the Marx Brother's movie .Duck 
Soup. To all but the sea-and-ski set, the tiny Caribbean nations 
that assisted in the invasion were as obscure as Grenada itself. 
The line-up sounded more like a travel brochure than a military 
alliance: Antigua, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Dominica, Jamaica, and 
Barbados-it was laughable. Now that episode was being re-
peated on a grander and far more sinister scale. But could it be 
stopped? 
******************** 
The Speaker of the House was listening with minor irritation 
to the ranking senator at the ad hoc meeting of the congressional 
party leadership. 
"I know that we have, as the Speaker pointed out, a broad 
bipartisan coalition on this thing," the Senator was sayin~. '~I 
know, in other words, that we have the votes. My quest10n IS 
whether it is fair to the country to put the President to the embar-
rassment of a congressional countermand. And my ultimate fear 
is even worse-what if he disobeys us? What if we take the issue 
to the Supreme Court and lose? Then what becomes of congres-
sional oversight? Or what, God forbid, if we win in the Supreme 
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Court, and the President ignores the Court's order? Is it fair to 
our boys, already caught in the crossfires of battle, to imperil them 
through constitutional crossfires at home?" 
"The President would never disobey the Court's mandate, if 
it comes to that," interrupted the Speaker. "Even Nixon obeyed 
the Supreme Court's order to surrender the tapes." 
"How do you know that?" the Senator challenged. "Nixon 
obeyed, but were you sure he would? Some say he toyed with call-
ing the 92nd Airborne into Washington. And plenty of Presidents 
have flouted or skirted Supreme Court mandates. The problem is 
as old as Marbury versus Madison, or Lincoln's defiance of Chief 
Justice Taney when Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas 
corpus." 
The Speaker winced. He hated having people use Lincoln 
against him. But the lapse in his control was only fleeting. "Sena-
tor," said the Speaker, "your fears are not frivolous, but if we 
don't force the President to choose between brute power and the 
constitutional process, then brute power will have won anyway, 
because fear of it is enough to back us down. A majority of this 
Congress wants no war in Central America. If we cannot enforce 
our will in this case, the constitutional role of Congress in deci-
sions to go to war is a dead letter." 
The Senator was not completely willing to retreat. "But with 
all respect, Mr. Speaker, perhaps we could maintain our role with 
a less aggressive and less potentially traumatic course. Under the 
War Powers Resolution's automatic sixty-day pullout provision, 
the troops must be pulled out after sixty days unless Congress acts 
affirmatively to authorize further hostilities. We could simply 
send the President the message that no such authorization would 
be forthcoming." 
The Speaker's aides had prepared him for this argument. 
"So you advocate, Senator, the path of least resistance, which is to 
really do nothing, which gives the President a blank check to de-
stroy Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and maybe 
even Cuba, if he can get it done in sixty days. He might even 
destroy the whole world, which he could probably do in about 
sixty minutes." 
The Senator started to protest but the Speaker cut him off. It 
would be his meeting now. "Unfortunately, Senator, even the 
simplest option isn't simple. For one thing, to accede to the sixty-
day option is to accept the President's war, and it undercuts the 
moral force of the position that the war is unconstitutional. And 
to use your own point, sir, the longer American troops are embat-
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tled the tougher it becomes for Congress to abandon them out 
there. The more the war goes on the more the inertia is with the 
President. That is what we learned from Vietnam. There's also a 
second problem with the sixty-day option: it's the "who starts the 
clock" problem. Does the sixty-day clock start ticking as soon as 
the first marines hit the beach, or do we first have to start it 
running?" 
"You're apparently the expert, Mr. Speaker," said the Sena-
tor. "What's the answer?" 
"The resolution says nothing whatsoever about Congress 
having to start the clock. The language of the resolution starts the 
clock automatically when hostilities begin. But when Reagan sent 
troops to Lebanon we all acted like the sixty-day provision would 
not be activated without an affirmative vote starting the clock. 
And in a lawsuit brought by thirty congressmen in 1983 against 
Ronald Reagan for his secret war in Nicaragua, the lower court 
said that the clock did not start on its own. The court left an out, 
saying that the clock might start on its own in a less ambiguous 
situation-but how do we know what a court would do this time?'' 
"We could handle the clock problem by simply voting to start 
it," the Senator said. 
"Sure we could," said the Speaker. "But what's the point? 
There is still the danger that after sixty days the President may 
continue to fight, claiming the War Powers Resolution is totally 
unconstitutional. So then we are in court all over again, and its 
the same face-off. But in the meantime, we've had sixty days of 
misguided war and death, to which we would have acceded." 
No one else motioned to speak for several moments. The 
Senator then stated simply, "Though with reservations, I accept 
the Speaker's position." 
The Speaker was pleased. The caucus was unified; the con-
current resolution ordering an immediate cessation of all hostili-
ties and pullout of all troops would pass both houses of Congress . 
•••••••••••••••••••• 
The Secretary of State was almost jealous of the Attorney 
General, who knew the art of always appearing to exercise in-
dependent judgment, while telling the President precisely what he 
wanted to hear. 
"And so, Mr. President, since the congressional pullout reso-
lution violates the Supreme Court's legislative veto decision in 
INS versus Chadha, and since it is inimical to your constitutional 
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power as Commander-in-Chief, I would recommend that you de-
clare it a legal nullity, an unconstitutional act, and ignore it." 
"That sir," said the President, "is precisely what I intend to 
do." The President paused, to let the impact of his decision sink 
in. He then spoke again. "I have one final bit of business before 
the cabinet meeting is disbanded. It seems that our contingency 
plans regarding Cuba and the Soviets have mysteriously leaked to 
the Washington Post." 
My God, thought the stunned Secretary of State. Did he 
know? As the President glanced around the table, had the Presi-
dent's gaze lingered an extra second on him? 
"I know," the President continued, "that the need to bring in 
staff on these matters makes leaks a problem. Luckily we have 
contained the leak for now. But as the Sergeant used to say on 
"Hill Street Blues," 'Let's be careful out there!' " The President 
smiled and let his eyes wander around the room as he rose to his 
feet, signaling the end of the meeting. As his eyes fleetingly met 
those of the Secretary of State, they seemed, ever so slightly, to 
narrow. 
******************** 
As Susan Marks reread her lead story for the Washington 
Post on the Supreme Court's decision, she again asked herself 
whether she should put into it the additional information that she 
had obtained. Her "special relationship" with the Secretary of 
State had already caused both of them terrible embarrassment. 
The Secretary's disclosures to her had somehow gotten back to the 
President, almost certainly through her own editor. Now the same 
relationship with the Secretary had put a new light on one of the 
most extraordinary Supreme Court opinions in history. The Sec-
retary had an old and intimate friend on the Court, the Senior 
Associate Justice. Unbeknownst to anyone, even the Justice's own 
clerks, the Secretary and the Justice had "collaborated" on the 
Justice's opinion. The two had concocted a bizarre strategy: the 
Senior Associate Justice, though deeply opposed to the President's 
war and firmly convinced of its illegality, would vote for the Presi-
dent, but his opinion would be so cast as to prod the Congress to 
remove the President from office. 
The Secretary and the Justice felt the impact of their opinion 
would depend on the slant taken by the media. They wanted Su-
san to portray the Court's action as a virtual command to Con-
gress to impeach. She was convinced that their already surreal 
strategy could not sustain any additional weight. There was too 
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much chance that blatantly manipulating the tone of her article 
would backfire. Better to underplay the hand, to write a story that 
let the justices' opinions speak for themselves. In an hour her 
story would hit the newsstands in a special edition: 
THE WASHINGTON POST 
by Susan Marks 
Only days after the initiation of litigation against the President by the Senate 
and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court announced a decision uphold-
ing the challenge to the legality of the Central American war. 
The expedited litigation process was extremely unusual; legal scholars have 
pointed to the Court's decisions in President Truman's seizure of the steel mills 
during the Korean War and the Nixon Watergate tapes decision as among the 
few prior examples of such swift action. 
The Court's split decision was embodied in two opinions. Three Associate 
Justices joined in the opinion of the Chief Justice, holding that the President's 
actions in invading Central America were within his inherent power as Com-
mander-in-Chief, and ruling that the concurrent resolution ordering a pullout was 
an unconstitutional use of the legislative veto device. 
The Senior Associate Justice wrote the only other opinion, holding that the 
case was "nonjusticiable" because it dealt with a question that could only be re-
solved through the impeachment process. He also wrote, however, that the Presi-
dent had exceeded his power under the Constitution, and that the Congress's 
concurrent pullout resolution was legally binding on the President. 
Four dissenting Justices, who did not author any separate opinions, joined in 
those aspects of the Senior Associate Justice's opinion that declared the Presi-
dent's actions illegal. But they did not join in the Senior Associate Justice's view 
that the Supreme Court had no power to do anything about it. 
The only constitutional remedy for the President's usurpation of power, the 
Senior Associate Justice wrote, was impeachment. Combined with the Chief Jus-
tice's opinion, this unusual split produced five votes in favor of the President, 
even though a different majority of five Justices actually held that the President's 
use of military force had exceeded his constitutional authority, and that the con-
current resolution ordering a pullout was binding on the President. Excerpts from 
both opinions are printed below. 
The opinion of the Chief Justice began by stating that "history has created a 
gloss on the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief that cannot be ig-
nored by this Court. Although history alone cannot alter the constitutional text 
when that text is clear, time does work changes in the twilight zones of constitu-
tional law. The inherent power of the President to commit American armed 
forces to combat exists in such a zone of twilight." The Chief Justice's opinion 
then reviewed the historical "gloss" that has come to surround the power of the 
President as Commander-in-Chief: 
The Constitution provides that the Congress shall have the power "To 
declare War," ''To raise and support Armies," ''To provide and maintain a 
Navy," and ''To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land 
and naval forces." The Constitution also declares, however, that ''The Presi-
dent shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States." Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 69 wrote that the division 
of war power contemplated by the cold language of the Constitution is that 
the Congress shall have the power to initiate war, and the President the 
power to conduct war previously initiated by the Congress. Hamilton thus 
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contrasted the constitutional scheme with the authority of the British 
monarch: 
"The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the 
United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same 
with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It 
would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of 
the military forces, . . . while that of the British king extends to the declaring 
of war and to the raising and regularing of fleets and armies,-all which, by 
the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature." 
History, however, has not maintained the neat division between the de-
claring and waging of war, and not even Alexander Hamilton himself 
thought that the text was intended to straight-jacket the President in times 
when decisive action was necessary. The language of the Constitution 
notwithstanding, American presidents have constantly engaged American 
military forces in "undeclared wars," relying on claims of inherent presiden-
tial power to utilize American military force without congressional 
authorization. 
Three theories have been used to justify presidential war making: the 
"self-defense" or "sudden attack" theory, the "neutrality" theory, and the 
"collective security" theory. President Jefferson sent a squadron of Ameri-
can frigates to the Mediterranean to protect our American ships in response 
to a declaration of war against the United States by the Bey of Tripoli. Jef-
ferson, unlike most Presidents after him, did have doubts about his power as 
President to respond against Tripoli in the absence of congressional authori-
zation. Interestingly. however, Hamilton eschewed the sharp division be-
tween congressional and presidential war powers that he had expressed in his 
Federa/isr essay, and instead criticized Jefferson's hesitancy, contending that 
although the Constitution vested in Congress the power to declare war, when 
another nation made war upon the United States we were already in a state 
of war and no declaration by Congress was required. This was the first invo-
cation of the "self-defense" justification for the presidential use of force with-
out congressional approval. In 1863, the Supreme Court in The Prize Cases 
sustained President Lincoln's blockade of Southern ports at a time when 
Congress was not in session. The Court acknowledged that the President 
"has no power to declare a war," but held the "[i)f a war be made by invasion 
of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist 
force by force." Although the President "does not initiate the war," the 
Court stated, he "is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any 
special legislative authority." The dissent in The Prize Cases took a far more 
circumscribed view of presidential war-making power, arguing that "this 
great power . . . is reserved to the legislative department by the express 
words of the Constitution. It cannot be delegated or surrendered to the Exec-
utive." The view of the dissent, however, has never been accepted by this 
Court. The holding in The Prize Cases has never been undermined, and in 
fact the actions of American Presidents have gone well beyond the self-de-
fense theory used by Jefferson and Lincoln. 
The second theory supporting "undeclared war" was the "neutrality the-
ory." It evolved in the nineteenth century as a justification for sending troops 
into foreign countries to protect United States nationals and property, and it 
worked a substantial expansion of the President's war power. When Ameri-
can forces were sent to a foreign nation to secure the safety of American 
citizens and their property, the troops were "neutral" with regard to any con-
flicts within the nation; they were merely acting as security guards to be in-
terposed to protect American interests. 
Since 1945 a third justification for presidential war making has evolved, 
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the "collective security" theory. Under this theory, presidential decisions to 
employ military force without congressional authorization have been de-
fended as within the executive's power under collective security agreements 
such as NATO and SEA TO. Once the United States enters into either a 
formal treaty or informal executive agreement that commits the United 
States to a mutual defense obligation, the President, if he regards the nation's 
obligations under the collective security agreement triggered, may on his own 
initiative commence war. Recent Presidents have given the term "collective 
security," expansive definition, and today the collective security theory will 
legitimately justify any colorably rational unilateral presidential use of 
armed force. 
The actions of Presidents in this century have steadily eroded the con-
gressional role in decisions to employ military force. The momentum of 
presidential war making that began in this century with Theodore 
Roosevelt's Panama excursion in 1903 was greatly accelerated when Presi-
dent Truman ordered troops to South Korea to fight the North Koreans 
without obtaining a declaration of war, on the thin rationale that the conflict 
was not a war but a "police action." Truman made no personal statement 
explaining his authority under the Constitution, but his administration 
through a State Department bulletin asserted that "the President, as Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, has full control 
over the use thereof." Although the Court in The Steel Seizure Case would 
not permit use of the President's authority to prosecute the Korean War as a 
bridge to an ambiguous assertion of the presidential power in the domestic 
sphere, the Justices in their opinions also studiously avoided any intimation 
that the Korean War was itself unconstitutional. In justifying Truman's ac-
tions in Korea, Secretary of State Dean Acheson emphatically declared that 
"not only has the President the authority to use the Armed Forces in carrying 
out the broad foreign policy of the United States and implementing treaties, 
but it is equally clear that this authority may not be interfered with by the 
Congress in the exercise of powers which it has under the Constitution." 
Although at times recent Presidents have relied on highly generalized 
resolutions from Congress to justify armed intervention-President Ken-
nedy's quarantine against Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis was justified 
on the basis of a prior joint resolution and the OAS treaty, President John-
son's ordering of Marines to Santo Domingo was justified first on a neutrality 
theory and later as a fulfillment of obligations under the OAS charter, and 
the War in Vietnam was carried on by Johnson pursuant to the Gulf of Ton-
kin Resolution-the modem reality has been to make Congressional ap-
proval a formality to be observed if and when a sitting President deems fit. 
Even if the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution were accepted as a sort of inartful 
declaration of war, for example, the fact remains that Richard Nixon contin-
ued to sustain the war after the resolution was repealed outright in January 
of 1971, a repeal that he signed himself. Once the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 
was repealed, President Nixon's continued use of armed force in Vietnam 
was done without any explicit congressional authority, yet judicial challenges 
to the constitutionality of the Vietnam War were repeatedly rebuffed. 
In sum, recent history has developed a sort of national ambivalence 
about the war power. Although the pious cliche that only Congress can de-
clare war is usually recited, it seems to have been either widely believed or 
conceded that as a practical matter Presidents may simply use the armed 
forces as they see fit. This historical evolution has been the unavoidable con-
sequence of the emergence of the United States as a dominant military 
power. Today our nation is a shining city on a hill, the world's preeminent 
bastion and defender of democracy. As a dominant nuclear power the 
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United States is far different today than it was as a fledging new nation in 
1789, and the powers of the Presidency have by necessity grown with the 
power of the nation. The position of the Senate and the House of Represent-
atives in this litigation is that this Court must turn a blind eye to the realities 
of the nuclear age, and instead mire the constitutional power over war in an 
anachronistic and mechanistic literalism. Our Constitution-indeed our na-
tion-would not have survived long in the face of such rigidity. In the words 
of John Marshall, it is, after all "a Constitution we are expounding." We hold 
that the invasion of Central America, and the continued conduct of that war, 
are permissible exercises of the Presidential power pursuant to the President's 
authority as Commander-in-Chief. 
We turn next to the question of whether the concurrent resolution 
passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives is sufficient to coun-
termand the President, binding him to terminate hostilities. Our review of 
this question is narrow. We do not have before us a statute passed after 
overriding a Presidential veto, by a two-thirds majority of both houses. We 
need not reach the question of whether such a statute would constitutionally 
bind the President. We have instead a resolution passed by a simple majority 
of both houses, ordering immediate cessation of hostilities and a troop pull-
out as expeditiously as possible consistent with the safety of the troops. The 
President in a message to both houses stated that he was unable to determine 
from the form of the resolution whether or not it was intended to be treated 
by him as a bill which had been presented to him for his approval or disap-
proval, or a resolution not intended for formal presentment to him. He 
stated, however, that if it were a bill, then his message to both chambers was 
that it was disapproved. If it were not a bill, then his message to both cham-
bers was that it was not constitutionally binding upon him. Upon receiving 
this message, the Senate voted by a vote of 67 to 33 to override the Presi-
dent's veto, a two-thirds majority. In the House of Representatives, however, 
the override motion carried by less than the necessary two-thirds majority. 
Both chambers then voted to commence this litigation, relying on the War 
Powers Resolution of 1973. 
Doubts about the legality of the Vietnam War, and the apparent futility 
of attempted judicial intervention, formed the background for the War Pow-
ers Resolution of 1973. The War Powers Resolution was intended as a dra-
matic and forceful reassertion of the constitutional moorings of the respective 
war powers of the Congress and the President. The Resolution was intended 
to "fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States 
and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the Presi-
dent will apply to the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into 
hostilities." The Resolution states that the President has the power to intro-
duce United States armed forces into hostilities, or situations where immi-
nent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated, in three situations: 
(I) after a Congressional declaration of war; (2) by specific statutory authori-
zation; or (3) in a national emergency created by attack upon the United 
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces. The Resolution re-
quires consultation with Congress "in every possible instance." 
Section 5 of the resolution sets forth two mechanisms for terminating a 
war begun by the President. The Resolution purports to limit whatever 
power the President may have inherently or may have been delegated (by 
section 2(c) of the Resolution itself) to wage "short wars" on his own, to wars 
of 60 days duration. More importantly, it provides that at any time after 
American troops become engaged in hostilities outside of the United States, 
Congress can order the troops removed by concurrent resolution. The power 
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of Section S(c) comes from the fact that it can be invoked instantly to stop an 
incipient war effort, and that it becomes legally effective without the concur-
rence of the President. The joint resolution allowed for in Section 5(c) is a 
legislative veto device that does not include presentment to the President and 
thus is not subject to presidential countermanding. 
Since 1973 Presidents have in substance ignored the War Powers Reso-
lution. President Ford, for example, defended the Mayaguez rescue mission, 
carried on without observing the War Powers Resolution requirements, as 
"ordered and conducted pursuant to the President's constitutional executive 
power and his authority as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed 
Forces." President Carter did not appear constrained by the War Powers 
Resolution in declaring his "Carter Doctrine" in 1980, that any "attempt by 
an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as 
an assault on the vital interests of the United States," to be "repelled by use 
of any means necessary, including military force." In Grenada and Leba-
non, President Ronald Reagan did not observe the War Powers Resolution. 
In Lebanon, Reagan originally took the position that the War Powers Reso-
lution was inapplicable. Only after the Marine Massacre did he agree to an 
18 month compromise to govern the Marines' length of stay. 
The House and Senate first argue that whatever the Presidents inherent 
powers as Commander-in-Chief may be, the War Powers Resolution has 
trimmed those powers back to the three enumerated authorizations for use of 
force set forth in the Resolution itself. Since the current Central American 
war is not being fought pursuant to any explicit congressional authorization, 
or declaration of war, and since it is not in response to an attack on the 
United States, in territories, possessions, or forces, the Senate and House 
maintain that it is illegal. 
We find this analysis seriously flawed, both as a matter of statutory in-
terpretation and as a matter of constitutional law. The War Powers Resolu-
tion states in Section 2 that "It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill 
the intent of the framers of the Constitution." Section 8(d)(l) of the resolu-
tion further states that "Noting in this Resolution-(!) is intended to alter the 
constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President." The expressed 
intent of the Resolution itself is thus that it is not to alter the pre-existing 
division of constitutional authority. Yet the limitations on presidential use of 
armed forces of Section 2(c) of the Resolution seemingly does purport to 
constrict the power of the President to something less than his constitutional 
authority would otherwise be. We resolve this inconsistency within the stat-
ute by construing the limitations of Section 2 of the Resolution, which is 
labeled the "Purpose and Policy" section of the statute, as merely precatory, 
and not legally binding on the President. In doing so we follow the familiar 
cannon that a statute should whenever possible be construed so as to save it 
from constitutional infirmity. 
More fundamentally, however, we hold that even if the limitations in 
section 2(c) were intended to be legally binding, they would be unconstitu-
tional. Congress cannot amend the Constitution by statute. In Part I of this 
opinion we liberally construed the President's inherent powers as Com-
mander-in-Chief. Congress cannot subtract from the powers that the Consti-
tution reserves to the President. 
The Senate and House of Representatives finally maintain that even if 
the President did have inherent authority to invade Central America, and 
even if Section (2) of the War Powers Resolution could not of its own force 
restrict that authority, that the concurrent resolution, passed I 0 days ago pur-
suant to section S(c) of the War Powers Resolution, requires that the Presi-
dent terminate the war. On this point there is no question but that the House 
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and Senate are correct in interpreting the statute. Section 5(c) of the statute 
quite clearly authorizes the concurrent resolution device that has been em-
ployed in this instance. 
We hold, however, that section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution is an 
unconstitutional use of the legislative veto device we declared invalid in Im-
migration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, Process Gas Consumers v. 
Consumers Energy Council of America, and United States Senate v. Federal 
Trade Commission. In Chadha, which involved a one-house veto, and in the 
subsequent two-house veto cases Process Gas and FTC, we held that legisla-
tive vetoes, of which section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution is a prime 
example, undermine the role of the President in the legislative process, as 
prescribed by the Presentment Clauses, run afoul of the principle of bicamer-
alism, and violate the principle of separation of powers. In Chadha this 
Court first relied upon "presentment clauses" of Article I, which provide 
that: 
"Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and 
the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the 
United States." 
"Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which th'! Concurrence of the Sen-
ate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of 
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and 
before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disap-
proved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of 
Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the 
Case of a Bill." The Senate and House in this case are attempting to over-
ride the President's veto without the necessary two-thirds majority. This the 
Constitution does not permit. 
In the case of the one-house legislative veto at issue in Chadha, the sec-
ond objection was that one house was permitted to do what the Constitution 
requires of two. Although it might appear that the two-house veto at issue 
here would avoid any bicameralism objections, our affirrnances of the lower 
court ruling in Process Gas and FTC, which had declared two-house vetoes 
unconstitutional, makes it clear that the two-house veto is in no stronger con-
stitutional position than its one-house cousin. Although we wrote no opinion 
in the two-house veto cases, our summary affirmance quite clearly shows that 
a majority of this Court rejected Justice White's dissent, in which he tried to 
salvage the two-house veto mechanism. We finally note that the two-house 
veto is actually on weaker constitutional grounds than its one-house counter-
part. Two-house vetoes suffer from the embarrassing irony of less resem-
blance to the traditional legislative process than one-house vetoes. Normally 
one house acting alone can block any attempt to alter the status quo, by 
refusing to pass a bill. In the two-house veto situation, a change in the status 
quo can come about with the concurrence of the President and just one 
house, since the disapproval of two houses is necessary to defeat it. 
In sum, Section 5(c) is an unconstitutional legislative veto, and the con-
current resolution ordering the President to cease the war is an unconstitu-
tional act, which the President may ignore. 
The only other opinion in the case was authored by the Senior Associate Justice 
of the Court. The highlights of his opinion appear below: 
I disagree with every element of the Chief Justice's opinion. I believe 
that the President violated both the letter and spirit of the Constitution and 
the War Powers Resolution when he invaded Central America. I further 
believe that the concurrent pullout resolution is binding on the President. 
My four dissenting Brethren join in Parts I and II of my opinion, in which I 
state my disagreement with the Chief Justice, and with the President. My 
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four dissenting Brethren and I, although in agreement on the merits of this 
dispute, are nonetheless in disagreement as to the appropriate remedy. My 
dissenting Brethren would issue an order from this Court that the President 
withdraw the troops, as Congress has commanded. In Part III of this opin-
ion, which they do not join, I state my view that the only available remedy 
for the President's violation of the Constitution and his defiance of Congress 
is impeachment. 
I tum first to the issue of the President's inherent power as Commander-
in-Chief. 
The most famous analysis of inherent presidential authority is that of 
Justice Robert Jackson in The Steel Seizure Case. Jackson identified three 
levels of presidential power. First, when ''the President acts pursuant to an 
express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maxi-
mum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Con-
gress can delegate." Second, when "the President acts in absence of either a 
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own 
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress 
may have concurrent authority or in which its distribution is uncertain." 
Third, when "the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed 
or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb .... " In The 
Iranian Assets Case, the Supreme Court indicated that it still found Justice 
Jackson's tripartite analysis to be the most useful starting point for analysis. 
Under Justice Jackson's analysis, claims of inherent presidential war-
making power were entitled to greater deference before the War Powers Res-
olution, when presidential use of military force without congressional ap-
proval fell into the "twilight zone" of type two--that area in which Congress 
has been silent and the division of power uncertain. But since the Constitu-
tion gives only to Congress the power to declare war, and since the necessary 
and proper clause attaches to the war power, Congress must have the power 
to reinforce the constitutional division by acting in advance to move war-
making from area two of Jackson's analysis into area three-that sphere in 
which the President's power "is at its lowest ebb." 
In an outstanding recent discussion of inherent Presidential power, Pro-
fessor Erwin Chemerinsky has suggested that claims of inherent presidential 
authority be assessed under three different tests: their effects on the language 
of the Constitutional text, their functional effects on the performance of each 
branch of government, and their effects on maintaining presidential account-
ability. Measured against this highly insightful standard, the War Powers 
Resolution as it presently stands fares very well. The consistency of the Res-
olution with the paper division of authority is total; Congress has exclusive 
power to declare war under the words of the text. The functional effects of 
the War Powers Resolution are reasonably balanced. The President is not at 
all disabled from pursuing his function as Commander-in-Chief, and he re-
tains power to act immediately in a genuine emergency, when the nation, its 
forces, or possessions are under attack. Note that the most devastating of all 
wars, a nuclear exchange, is actually permitted by the language of the Reso-
lution, in response to an enemy attack. It is true that the Resolution does not 
allow intervention under the "neutrality" or "collective security" theories. 
But it would be a very rare occasion for armed intervention ever to be imme-
diately necessary under either of those theories, and thus the President has no 
legitimate excuse for not obtaining congressional authorization when one of 
those theories forms the predicate for his actions. Nor does the 60-day auto-
matic cut-off period in any way hamper the President's functions as Com-
mander-in-Chief. The 60-day period is in effect a very loose Congressional 
delegation of authority to the President, in which he is given a relatively free 
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hand to deal with short term emergencies in response to a/lack. To avoid the 
danger that the response to a trivial attack might lead us into a protracted 
war (in retrospect the Tonkin Gulf incident is a chilling case in point), Con-
gress has written an insurance policy that requires reexamination after the 
first 60 days. Since the Constitution on its face leaves the President with no 
authority to launch an undeclared war, presidential attacks on the 60-day 
compromise do not ring with much authority. Finally, the entire War Pow-
ers Resolution serves the enormously important value of accountability. 
Half the nation ought not be forced to take to the streets to force undeclared 
wars to an end. 
This is the strongest moral case for the War Powers Resolution: the 
decision to wage war should remain essentially democratic in an open soci-
ety, and Presidents should not be free to invoke dubious claims of "inherent 
power" to avoid the democratic process. The Resolution merely restores to 
the Congress power that the Constitution originally placed with it, power 
that has by slow historical degree slipped away from Congress and been ad-
ded through accretion to the presidency. Congress will probably make use of 
the veto capability to terminate hostilities very rarely-prior to this crisis it 
had never once been formally invoked since 1973-but the threat of such use 
is vital in restraining nondemocratic executive action in the sphere of govern-
mental activity in which democratic approval is the most morally compel-
ling: the decision to fight a war. The threat and its moderating effect on the 
actions of presidents is not illusory. When Congress informally demon-
strated its willingness to veto the sale of 14 Hawk Missile batteries to Jordan 
in 1975, for example, the President backed down. And more recently, threats 
of congressional intervention in the Lebanon crisis forced Ronald Reagan to 
approach Congress to obtain a negotiated 18 month compromise. Presidents 
have not shown a willingness to so involve the Congress out of the goodness 
of their Oval Office hearts. Some formal threat of a veto of presidential wars 
is essential. In an era in which American presidents are periodically tempted 
to launch military escapades at odds with the preferences of the elected rep-
resentatives of the American people, the case for reinvigorating formal con-
gressional restraints not subject to presidential override is compelling. The 
Constitution has its own theory of how best to check the dog of war; it is to 
place the war power in the hands of the most democratic branch of govern-
ment. A return to original constitutional values-a return that ironically is 
essentially conservative-is the best prospect for peace in an increasingly bel-
licose world. 
In Part II of his opinion the Senior Associate Justice discussed the pullout 
resolution: 
The issue of inherent presidential power aside, the Chief Justice invokes 
Chadha to hold the concurrent resolution unconstitutional. Because the two-
house veto avoids the requirement of presentment, the Chief Justice reasons 
that it violates the literalist analysis of Chadha without more. When the 
President sends troops into hostilities in violation of the War Powers Resolu-
tion he changes the real world status quo. In attempting to countermand that 
status quo by joint resolution, Congress surely acts within the core of the 
"spirit" of the Constitution-since only Congress was supposed to be able to 
engage our forces in hostilities in the first place-but under the Chief Jus-
lice's analysis of Chadha it appears that Congress nonetheless violates the 
constitutional letter. 
But it does not follow inexorably from Chadha that the War Powers 
Resolution veto is invalid. Nearly two centuries ago, this Court in Hollings-
worth v. Virginia rejected a challenge to the validity of the Eleventh Amend-
ment on the grounds that the amendment was invalid because it was 
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proposed to the states by Congress in a joint resolution that had never been 
presented to the President for signature. The Court stated simply that "the 
negative of the President applies only to ordinary legislation. He has nothing 
to do with . . . amendments to the Constitution." Thus, not all joint actions 
by Congress require a presentment to the President to be valid. 
The soundest analysis is that the War Powers Resolution veto is differ-
ent from the sort of veto in Chadha, precisely because it deals with a constitu-
tional power (declaration of war) that exists only in the Congress and cannot 
be delegated to or usurped by the President. It is one thing to say that Con-
gress may not use the veto device to reverse the administrative action of the 
President or an agency when that administrative action is taken under the 
color of previously delegated authority. As Chief Justice Burger demon-
strated in Chadha, such use of the veto does in effect "relegislate" without 
going through the constitutional process of legislation. But when the Presi-
dent sends troops to invade a foreign nation without prior congressional au-
thorization he invades not only that nation, but the exclusive constitutional 
province of the Congress. When Congress countermands such an action, 
merely recapturing that which it never legally surrendered, what possible 
sense does it make to allow the President to veto (either explicitly, or by ig-
noring the concurrent resolution) that action? 
In the final section of his opinion, a section in which no one else on the Court 
joined, the Senior Associate Justice explained why he was unwilling to issue an 
order directing the President to end the war: 
Despite my view that the President's action in invading Central America 
was unconstitutional, and that the concurrent withdrawal resolution is bind-
ing on the President, I am not willing to vote with my four dissenting Breth-
ren, who would have this Court directly order the President to stop the war. 
I am instead of the view that the only remedy available to the Senate and the 
House of Representatives is impeachment. Therefore, although I disagree 
with everything said on the merits in the four-Justice opinion authored by 
the Chief Justice, I nonetheless reluctantly vote with that plurality in refusing 
to issue any judgment against the President in this case. 
This litigation is unlike United States v. Nixon, in which Richard 
Nixon's resistance to a subpoena of the Watergate tapes on a claim of Execu-
tive Privilege was held justiciable by this Court. The Nixon case involved an 
attempt by the President to avoid the normal rules of the judicial process 
itself, and although the shadow of parallel legislative activity in the form of 
the impeachment hearings of the House Committee on the Judiciary surely 
formed part of the historical and political backdrop of the Nixon decision, 
the fact remains that the actual dispute in that case was not between the 
President and Congress, but between the President and the Judiciary in a 
criminal prosecution. In this instance, however, we are dealing with a dis-
pute that pits the President directly against the Congress. We are asked to 
settle a dispute between two other coequal branches of Government on a 
matter related to foreign affairs. In Goldwater v. Carter, in which Senator 
Barry Goldwater sued President Jimmy Carter, claiming that he had violated 
the Constitution in terminating a United States treaty with Taiwan, we voted 
that the case was nonjusticiable. We should do the same in the case before 
us. 
This does not mean that the nation has no recourse against this Presi-
dent for his unconstitutional prosecution of the Central American war. The 
Constitution, to the contrary, has provided its own special form of dispute 
resolution for this very type of situation. If the members of the House of 
Representatives believe that I and my four dissenting Brethren are correct in 
holding that the President has grossly abused his power, then they should 
vote to impeach the President, an act that can be accomplished through a 
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simple majority vote. If two-thirds of the Senate agree that the President's 
usurpation of power is extraordinarily dangerous and reprehensible, they 
may vote for his removal from office. It is worth noting that in the effort to 
override the veto of the concurrent pullout resolution, the override carried by 
a simple majority in the House, and by a two-thirds majority of the Senate. 
If the same voting pattern were to hold in an impeachment process, this Pres-
ident would be removed from office. 
The Supreme Court should not presume to do Congress's work, or fight 
its battles. This President's defiance of Congress has been extraordinary. 
But the remedy for such extraordinary defiance is not for Congress to hide 
behind this Court. The Constitution has armed Congress with its own rem-
edy for such defiance; it is up to the Congress to determine for itself whether 
it has the resolve and will to employ that remedy . 
•••••••••••••••••••• 
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The Chief Justice had been morose since the announcement 
of the Court's decision. He had thought that he had secured a 
victory for the President, but the critical fifth vote of the Senior 
Associate Justice had been a trap, and the jaws of the trap were 
squeezing shut. The Speaker of the House had railroaded a bill of 
impeachment through the House, and head counts in the Senate 
did not bode well for the President. Tensions in Central America, 
and with the Soviets, were at a fever pitch. The Chief Justice's 
only solace was that the American public continued to support the 
President, although the number of "undecided" responses had 
risen alarmingly. Now the President had summoned him to the 
oval office, for an unusual "off the record" conference. 
"Mr. President," said the Chief Justice, "I'm almost ashamed 
to be here-! feel as if I'm responsible for the fix you're in." 
"Don't blame yourself, Bob," said the President in an easy, 
relaxed tone, as he poured himself and the Chief Justice a pair of 
stiff drinks. "If you didn't have the votes, you didn't have the 
votes. Your opinion was great; it was an excellent statement of 
sensible constitutional law, and I think it will capture the hearts of 
the people and maybe even provide my salvation." 
"You're too generous, as always," the Chief Justice replied. 
"But talking about votes-the rumors on the hill are that you 
don't have them." 
"That's why you're here, Chief-" 
"And my presence here, it goes without saying, must remain 
strictly between the two of us," the Chief Justice interrupted. "I 
know the Speaker must have spies in the White House. If news of 
this meeting ever got out, they would be impeaching my ass, too. 
And I don't say that because that's important to me personally-
you know I'll do whatever I can to be of service to you and the 
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nation-but if news got out that the presiding judicial officer in 
the impeachment proceeding and the accused in the dock of the 
Senate were secretly conferring prior to the trial, it would be a 
debacle for the Constitution, for the Court, and for your 
Presidency." 
"Don't worry, Chief; no one knows you're here. Even my 
secretary thinks I'm taking a nap." 
"Well, you don't look like you need one," said the Chief Jus-
tice. "In this storm you've been calmer than all of us." 
"I have the clearest conscience; I am only serving the nation 
according to my lights. Before we sit down to business, though, I 
want you to know again that I completely appreciate your con-
cerns, but even more I admire your courage-! need your counsel; 
the country needs it. Your presence here is in the highest tradition 
of the Court. John Marshall would be proud." 
"Well then," said the Chief Justice, "I hope you've got some 
kind of plan. How does the impeachment look?" 
"Not good. I've already had my 'Barry Goldwater' speech-
just like Goldwater told Nixon he had no hope in the Senate, I've 
been told that I have the firm support of only fifteen Senators, and 
the soft support of maybe five more. The heavyweights in my 
own party are urging me to cave-in." 
"It's a tragedy," said the Chief Justice, "And it's a frightening 
moment for the world." 
"At the moment, I'm afraid, the impeachment is the least of 
my troubles. This morning we received two ominously conflicting 
messages from the Kremlin. The first a personal note from the 
Soviet Premier, delivered to me directly by the Soviet Ambassa-
dor. It indicated that although their public rhetoric would con-
tinue to quite aggressively condemn our 'imperialist war of 
aggression' in Central America, the Soviets would not intervene 
militarily in our 'sphere of influence.' The tone was conciliatory, 
calming, and reasonable. Then, one hour later, we received a new 
message from the Soviet Embassy, by special courier. This note 
was signed by the Foreign Minister, as 'official representative' of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic. It said-let me read this 
to you-the Premier's previously expressed sentiments 'did not 
represent the official views of the Soviet government.' The note 
sternly warned that 'the Soviet people would not permit the 
United States to ride roughshed over the right of self-determina-
tion of the people of Central America and Cuba'; and that the 
Soviet Union 'would employ whatever means are necessary to 
stop the war of aggression.' At exactly the second that the Soviet 
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Embassy attache entered the White House compound, the entire 
Soviet military apparatus went on its highest state of nuclear alert. 
We cannot contact the Ambassador, and we cannot reach the Pre-
mier, or anyone else, on the hot line. The Kremlin is for the mo-
ment in an information blackout. We don't know who's in 
control--or even if anyone's in control. My Joint Chiefs are be-
side themselves; they don't know whether to run, shit, or go 
blind." 
"What on earth are you going to do?" 
"I don't know, Bob, I just don't know. But how the hell am I 
supposed to fend off World War Ill while I spend my days at 
some bullshit trial in the Senate? It's insane. You know as well as 
I do that I haven't committed an impeachable offense. And the 
Vice President will carry on my policies if they do dump me. The 
damn thing would accomplish nothing. And the Joint Chiefs see 
the whole thing, at this moment of nuclear crisis, as a direct threat 
to national survival. They say they're not about to let the nation 
surrender to the Soviets because of some political squabble. This 
morning they tried to sell me on a plan. It scared the hell out of 
me . . . but they may be right." 
The Chief Justice's heart was pounding, but he tried to force 
himself to stare at the President in a well-practiced judicial poker 
face. "Exactly what, Mr. President, are they urging?" 
"They want me to go on the air to explain to the American 
people the two Soviet messages we have received, and to impress 
upon them the danger that nuclear war may be imminent, and 
that such a war is even more possible if the leadership in the 
United States appears to be faltering. They want me to declare a 
national military emergency, and pursuant to that declaration to 
state that until the current military emergency is over that I, as 
Commander-in-Chief, will ignore as legally nonbinding any fur-
ther prosecution of the impeachment process. Once the military 
crisis is over, the impeachment will resume. The Vice-President, 
members of the Cabinet, Joint Chiefs, and President Pro-
Tempore, on behalf of himself and twenty senators, would en-
dorse the plan. They would like your endorsement also. They 
would like for you to state that in your role as presiding judicial 
officer of the impeachment trial, you would find the declaration of 
national emergency legally and constitutionally sufficient to sus-
pend the impeachment process, and accordingly will rule out of 
order any attempt to commence the trial." 
"My God," said the Chief Justice. "They're talking about a 
goddamn coup d'etat! And the Vice-President! I'm amazed at 
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him for encouraging them-he went to Yale. And to think that 
they'd think I'd be a part of this, I mean, the law, the Constitution, 
is my life, my religion. Surely you don't think-" 
"Hold it right there! I respect the Constitution every bit as 
much as you do, and I'll goddamn preserve, protect, and defend it. 
I would never ask you to take any action that would impair the 
essential constitutional structure. But remember Lincoln, only 
this time we're facing Armageddon. The Constitution won't be 
worth much if there's no country left." 
For the first time, the Chief Justice was genuinely confused; 
he wasn't sure where the President was heading. 
"Anyway," the President continued somberly, "I didn't call 
you here to give you a sales pitch. What the hell am I going to do? 
You know the country can't stand this impeachment proceeding, 
not in this crisis. One way or another the impeachment issue has 
to be put aside. Hell, Bob, I don't know what to do. I'm just 
asking for a little time, I need somebody to buy me, to buy us, 
some time." 
In the silence that followed the Chief pondered his response. 
The conspicuous red phone on the President's desk began to 
buzz. 
